What are the risks of America breaking apart? Russia breaking apart?
Topics for evaluating the risks in the two countries
Ira Straus
To my
friends in both countries:
I think none
of us wants the other’s country to break up. Nor for our own to break up.
Anyway, I hope not, since either break-up would bring a lot of dangerous chaos.
It would probably also bring a worse regime in the successor entities – angrier,
more extreme -- not a better one.
Still, there is a lot of talk of break-up, as prediction and even as a political option. The talk itself can add to risk and become a self-fulfilling prophecy. In Russia, there is more talk of Russia breaking up than ever since 1991; and in America, more talk of America breaking up than probably ever since 1865.
I’ve been asking myself, ‘How can we usefully exchange thoughts on these dangers -- how serious are they, and what if anything should be done about them?’
One problem for such a dialogue: to fall into a defensive attitude, or denial, when discussing the danger of one’s own country’s break-up. I suppose I might bristle if some foreigner suggests that my country might break up. I can see some people becoming really defensive about it -- ‘You’re nuts if you think my country could break up, that’s just your delusion, you guys over there hate us too much!X!X.’ This, alas, doesn’t help us clarify what are the risks and how best to deal with them. Perhaps such discussions could have a rule of the road: ‘Let each person discuss only their own country’s risks of coming apart, and try avoiding defensive memes.’
Here’s a list
of questions one might feel like addressing about our country. Of course
others might want to add some more questions of their own, or subtract some from my
list.
1. Lines
of cleavage in one’s own country; risks of break-up
differences
between federal units
city vs
countryside
ethnic-racial
divisions
ideological
differences
regional
differences
foreign
powers that have different pulls on different regions of one’s country
economic
interests seeking local protection, resource-rich areas hoping to get rich
wish to
escape from center’s policies
wish to
escape from policies of other provinces on e.g. taxes, abortion, crime,
regulations, education
sub-provincial
secessionist tendencies (countryside leaving a dominant city inside US state,
e.g. the movement in rural eastern Oregon to separate from Portland and join
Idaho; ethnic Russians separating from a titular nationality)
1A. Causes
of break-ups affect their significance. Which of the above causes would lead to
relatively benign break-ups, which to more malign ones?
Could
break-ups be done peacefully? How to try to keep them peaceful; or would trying
to keep them peaceful just encourage the break-up? Would peaceful break-ups
today lead to violent conflicts tomorrow, e.g. by leading to revanchist
politics to reconquer the space?
2. Risks
of one’s country’s alliances coming apart
for Russia -
Belarus, China, BRICS, CIS, Central Asian states, Russia-dominated enclaves in
Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova
for US -
NATO, EU, UK, Pacific alliances, other alliances or partnerships in Mideast,
Africa, South Asia, Latin America
How strong
are domestic isolationist movements vis-a-vis the country’s alliances? How strong
are domestic groups that would prefer a reversal of alliances
-- Americans
who want to align with Putin against American wokeness or against LGBTQ, or
with Russia against China;
-- Russians
who want to align with the West against China rather than vice versa, or who
want to align with the West against Russian autocracy.
Would it be
better if these alliances came apart anyway?
3. Soft
secessionism: elements of divorce without formal break-up
Is a
quasi-divorce already occurring, in the form of migration and self-sorting of
populations? (or the opposite, is there increased intermixing through
migration?) Does this sorting do more to make secession more likely and prepare
for it, or to make it less likely by making the hard-core in each group more
satisfied with its local government? How well can the existing Federal system
accommodate the sharper differentiation of its member units?
Other forms
of quasi-secession:
in Russia:
local currencies, coupon currencies, provincial political bosses and patronage
systems; in Chechnya, own military and intelligence and criminal enforcement
services
in U.S.: sanctuary
cities, churches, and states (for illegal migrants, drugs, shoplifters, rioters,
guns). Insurrectionary riots; discrediting of law enforcement, accusing it of
being used discriminatorily, or weaponized.
Heightened
levels of mutual demonization, dislike, and distrust across party lines or
ethnic lines. What do surveys on this show in the US and Russia?
Division of
national media: in U.S., progressive-mainstream media vs Right media; in
Russia, government-controlled vs independent media. How (im)balanced are they
in audience size? How much do they communicate with the other to learn, how
much do they instead hear the other only as “the lie” that it’s their job to
combat and subdue?
4. What discussions are taking place in each country
of its own break-up?
extent and
prominence of discussion and expectations of break up or civil war
What surveys
are there, of public thinking on break-up – surveys on prediction, and surveys
on the wish?
What surveys
are there on civil war (as prediction, not wish)?
Interplay of
the break up and civil war discussions, as alternatives to each other or as
each leading to the other.
How much is
the wish for break-up the father to the thought or prediction of it? Is the
thought also father to the wish -- when people predict break-up, does it
normalize the thought of it, opening up space for the listeners to think it
might be OK to wish for it? How often is it the opposite -- a way of expressing
fear of secession, or a wish to stir up alarm about it and opposition to it?
How much
does the society tend to mix the ‘Is’ and ‘Ought’, i.e. take its guidance on
what to advocate from predictions of what will happen (so predictions of
break-up are to some degree also advocacy of it)? How much does it, to the
contrary, distinguish Is from Ought, and think it OK to advocate an Ought far
removed from the Is or from what is predicted?
What are the
secessionist movements and organizations in each country?
How
widespread are ideologies that can promote sympathy for break-up?
What role is
played by sentimental memories of past secessionist attempts, or past periods,
recent or ancient, of independence in some parts of the country?
5.
Discussions in each country of the other country’s break-up
How extensive
is the discussion about the opposite country breaking up? What prominent government and major media people
are talking about it?
How much of
this discussion is prediction about break-up, how much about risks of it, how
much is advocacy of it?
How much are
prediction and advocacy connected? Is the wish father to the thought (the wish
for it leads to predicting it)? Is the thought father to the wish (the
prediction leads people to think about it more favorably)?
Is the
possibility presented together with advocacy, or neutrally, as analysis of a
possibility that one has to be prepared for, e.g. to discuss what policy
responses would be appropriate if it were to happen?
Is there any
covert action promoting secessionism, such as funding of secessionist movements
or help in organizing them (some seeming examples: funding for and networking
with Euroskeptic parties across Europe, supporting UKIP in Brexit referendum,
support for Scottish secessionists)?
How much do
the country’s international propaganda media encourage divisiveness and
secessionism in the opposite country, or give support to secessionist forces?
When they talk about this, is it because they want it to happen, or they think
that their national leadership wants it to happen, or they are just giving
objective information and analysis about the opposite country, or it is just
part of their habit of highlighting bad news about the opposite country?
Is
encouragement of the other’s break-up effective, or counterproductive?
(Effective: by mainstreaming it, encouraging elites to contemplate it as a
normal thought and maybe adapt to it, and by encouraging secessionists to think
they have broad support. Counterproductive: by providing an image of a mortal
enemy to unite the country against, and making it easy to brand secessionists
as puppets of the enemy.)
How many
Russians think America is trying to break Russia up? How many Americans think
Russia is trying to break America up?
How much
does each country’s government or media accuse the other country of trying to
break it apart, promoting divisiveness in it, supporting secessionists?
How
justified are these accusations; how much are they projections onto foreigners of
the blame for one’s country’s own risks and fears of breaking up? How large is
the role of foreign promotion of break-up (usually in history small), compared
to domestic forces that want or lean toward break-up?
6. What
are scenarios under which break-up would become highly likely in each country?
What are
scenarios under which it would become highly unlikely for a long time to come?
7. What
would happen to seceding U.S. states or to seceding Russian regions?
Prosperity
from good policies? Poverty from bad ones, or from break-up with the Union
market? Moderation and political good feelings? Political or religious
extremism, flight of those who disagree to other states, a more radical
sortation of the population, cementing extremism in each state? Regional unions
of seceded states? Subsecessions to stay in the country or unite with other
federal units? Intra-state civil wars?
What foreign
countries could seceding entities ally with, or join? Would different entities
form opposing foreign alliances? How would the rest of the world be affected by
this geopolitical pluralism in the former superpower that had provided a core
cohesive factor in the world order?
8. What can each country do regarding the other’s
potential break-up:
What could each do to help cause the other’s break-up?
What could each do to help prevent the other’s break-up?
What could each do to help the other manage any unavoidable
break-up?
What could each do to manage the other’s break-up for its own
advantage?
9. What
can each country do to prevent itself from breaking up, or to manage any unavoidable
break-up?
What things might
each country do that would instead make its own break-up more likely, or worse?
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